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This paper reviews the history of executive compensation disclosure and other government 
policies affecting CEO pay, and as well surveys the literature on the effects of these policies. 
Disclosure has increased nearly uniformly since 1933. A number of other regulations, 
including special taxes on CEO pay and rules regarding votes on some pay packages have 
also been introduced, particularly in the last 20 years. However, there is little solid evidence 
that any of these policies have had any substantial impact on pay. Policy changes have likely 
helped drive the move towards more use of stock options, but there is no conclusive evidence 
on how policy has otherwise affected the level or composition of pay. I also review evidence 
from overseas on “Say on Pay,” recently proposed in the US, which would allow nonbinding 
shareholder votes on CEO compensation. The experiences of other countries have been 
positive, with tighter linkages between pay and performance and improved communication 
with investors. Mandatory say on pay would be beneficial in the US. 
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Over the last 15 years, there has been renewed public interest in executive 
compensation.  Especially beginning in the early 1990’s, there was substantial outcry 
over rising pay packages for CEOs while the wage of the average worker was stagnating.  
Piketty and Saez (2003) show that since the late 1970’s, the income of the richest 
Americans has diverged from the rest of the population.  At the same time, Dew-Becker 
and Gordon (2005) show that the income of nearly all American workers, with the 
exception of the top 10 percent, lagged average labor productivity growth.  Moreover, the 
divergence between the pay of CEOs and the average worker was far larger in the US 
than in any other country.   
Regardless of the cause of this divergence, it is not surprising that it brought 
enormous political pressure for change.  By the early 1990’s, executive pay packages 
looked especially unreasonable when compared to those in Japan, a country that, at the 
time, had far superior economic performance.  Therefore, in 1992 Congress enacted two 
major changes to the way executive compensation is treated.  First, mandatory disclosure 
of executive pay was expanded dramatically, with far more detailed explanations of 
precisely what executives are paid and why they are paid it.  Second, the tax code was 
changed so that all pay above $1 million that is not tied to performance is now deemed 
“excessive” and is not eligible to be deducted from corporate income for tax purposes.
1 
The 1992 laws are perhaps the best known changes in policy regarding executive 
pay, at least among economists.  However, the government treatment of executive pay 
has changed drastically over a much longer period.  This paper provides a short history of 
policies regarding executive pay since the 1930’s.  In particular, I look at disclosure rules, 
tax rules, and the effects of changes in legal liability.  There has been substantial research 
on the determinants of executive pay but surprisingly little on the policies that are used to 
control pay.  Throughout the paper, I try to note any available research on the effects of 
policy changes.  It is evident, though, that much more work could be done.  Policies that 
affect executive compensation are actively changing, with at least 5 major laws having 
been enacted over the past 16 years.  We know surprisingly little about their effects. . 
 
  What will become clear is that the United States currently has a surprisingly 
sensible set of disclosure rules.  The SEC has spent over 70 years fine-tuning the policies, 
and it is now difficult to find any major flaws that should be rectified.  I will argue that 
the developments that have occurred in compensation disclosure policy should be 
emulated elsewhere. 
The presence of good regulatory policy, however does not imply that corporate 
governance overall is perfect.  Rather, there is probably a lot we could do to improve the 
performance of boards of directors.
2  While there is little solid evidence on the effects of 
                                                 
1 The SEC also allowed shareholder proposals on executive compensation to be added to proxies.  I discuss 
this change in section 5 below. 
2 See, for example, the work of Lucian Bebchuk. corporate governance on executive pay, it does not take a huge leap of logic to see why 
weak corporate governance might leave executive pay excessively high. 
One recent proposal to improve governance is mandatory “Say on Pay.”  Under 
this plan, publicly traded companies would be required to put their CEO compensation 
plan up for a non-binding vote at each annual meeting.  Research on the effects of similar 
policies in other countries finds generally positive results.  I argue that the US would do 
well to adopt say on pay, and that the standard criticisms are not terribly convincing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 I review the 
history of disclosure rules, showing that they have followed a nearly continual trend 
towards more thoroughness.  Section 3 discusses how various government policies have 
affected the composition of executive pay, rather than just its level.  Section 4 examines 
corporate governance.  In section 5, I ask whether say on pay proposals are sensible and 
what effects we might expect them to have.  Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Disclosure Rules 
  The Beginning of Mandatory Disclosure 
The first requirements for disclosure by publicly traded firms were enacted in 
1933 with the Securities Acts.
3  All firms making a new offering were forced to register 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and send out a prospectus detailing 
the financial condition of the firm.  Firms listed on exchanges also had to send out proxy 
statements before annual meetings or shareholder votes.  The proxy statement was 
intended to give shareholders the necessary information to make informed votes about 
any proposals.  It had to contain information on the qualifications of any nominees for the 
board of directors, any transactions they have with the firm, and their holdings of 
company stock.  Furthermore, companies could recover the profits if any insider bought 
and sold stock within a 6-month window (however, public firms not listed on an 
exchange – over the counter, or OTC firms – were exempt from this requirement).  In 
other words, in the very first disclosure requirements, the SEC was already dealing with 
the possibility of directors acting in their own interests, rather than those of the 
shareholders.
4 
  In 1938, the SEC first required firms to disclose executive compensation.  The 
new proxies, along with the rules from 1933, began the systematic media scrutiny of 
executive pay.  In 1942 for the first time, the SEC required companies to disclose 
executive pay in a table, rather than just in narrative form.  The tabular disclosure was 
expanded also in 1952 to include pensions and deferred compensation.  By moving to 
                                                 
3 See Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) for an extensive explanation of these laws and 
subsequent amendments.  My description relies on their work. 
4 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006, study the cross-sectional relationship between disclosure 
laws, among others, and financial development in a large international sample.  They find that greater 
disclosure is related to greater financial development along a number of dimensions. tables, the SEC was helping to increase the transparency of disclosure, even if the actual 
amount of information disclosed was the same.  Just as with financial statements, the 
tabular disclosure is obviously much easier to grasp than a narrative.  In particular, it 
allows easy comparisons across firms and keeps firms from obscuring facts with 
accounting jargon.  However, by requiring only disclosure of specific types of pay rather 
than the total pay package, firms could disguise pay simply by using vehicles that were 
not required to be disclosed, such as perks.  Moreover, tabular disclosure necessarily 
forces firms to oversimplify their pay packages.  For example, investors are probably 
much more willing to pay a CEO a bonus when it is tied to some specific performance 
goal.  Simple tabular disclosure does not allow a firm to make clear exactly how pay is 
determined.  Throughout the history of disclosure regulations, the SEC has tried to 
balance transparency and detail. 
  
  The 1960’s and 70’s 
The last major expansion of the firm coverage of disclosure rules was in 1964.  
Essentially, it extended coverage to nearly all OTC firms.  There is evidence that prior to 
this disclosure, much of securities fraud, at least in terms of the raw number of offenses, 
was concentrated in these relatively unregulated firms (see Greenstone, Oyer, and 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006, and Seligman, 1995).  The majority of OTC firms did not even 
tell shareholders the names of the directors, let alone their qualifications or possible 
conflicts of interest.  30 percent of OTC firms did not even send out proxy statements 
before annual meetings.  Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen also note that people 
at the time believed that firms did not list themselves on stock exchanges precisely so 
they could avoid the disclosure requirements.  However, it is noteworthy that by severely 
limiting their disclosure, these firms probably opened themselves up to far higher risk of 
litigation than firms listed on exchanges (a topic to which I return below). 
  Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgenson (2006) provide one of the cleanest 
analyses of the effects of disclosure rules.  Prior to 1964, two equally sized firms with 
identical financial characteristics could have totally different disclosure requirements 
simply depending on whether they were listed on an exchange or not.  The 1964 rule 
changed that.  Using a variety of methods, Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2006) find that the firms to which the new rules applied had substantial excess returns.  
During the 18 months over which the new rules were considered and passed, these firms 
had a 4-factor alpha of 10 percent.
5  If the rules helped solve an agency problem due to 
imperfect monitoring, then this value was largely newly created.  On the other hand, it is 
possible that the rise in stock prices constituted simply a transfer of wealth from insiders 
to shareholders.  The authors note that they cannot test this possibility.  Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the effect is large and shareholders were left better off. 
  Throughout this period, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) required that 
executives pay taxes on any perks that they received that were not available to all 
                                                 
5 4-factor alpha is a measure of excess returns after controlling for 4 aggregate risk factors; see Carhart 
(1997). employees of their firm.  The rule, however, was not enforced until 1977.  In that year, a 
line was added to corporate income tax returns requiring disclosure of management 
perks, but companies said that they did not have the information necessary to report the 
value of perks.  In 1978, the SEC substantially expanded disclosure rules, requiring the 
summary compensation table in the proxy statement to cover all forms of compensation, 
including perks, contingent compensation, and expanded disclosure of the value of stock 
options and stock appreciation rights.  The IRS then expanded its Audit Technique 
Handbook in 1979 to inspect perks more closely.
6  McGahran (1988) studies these 
changes and finds that when perks became more expensive to executives due to the new 
tax treatment, they tended to shift compensation more towards salary. 
 
The Pendulum Swings Back 
  By the late 1970’s, essentially all major forms of compensation were being 
reported in tables.  Perks were included in the summary compensation table, and any perk 
valued at more than $25,000 (based on the incremental cost to the company) was reported 
in a footnote.  But in 1983, the SEC turned on its heel and markedly reduced disclosure.  
The summary compensation table now only included cash compensation, and firms no 
longer had to report contingent compensation, interest on deferred compensation, or 
dividends paid on restricted stock (even though they still had to pay taxes on this money).  
Moreover, the number of officers covered by disclosure was limited, and perks below the 
value of $25,000 no longer had to be reported anywhere.  Essentially, prior to 1983, all 
compensation that would show up somewhere on financial statements (though aggregated 
with other data) was to be reported in the proxy statement.  After 1983, this was no 
longer the case; there were substantial opportunities to obfuscate the true cost of 
compensating executives.   
Between 1938 and 1982, the SEC followed a path of only increasing disclosure.  
Bebchuk and Hamdani (2006) note this same trend as a part of generally increasing 
Federal regulation of securities markets.  Corporate law originated in state law, but 
through the 20
th century, the Federal government expanded its regulation of corporations 
as they became more national in character. In 1983 though, the SEC turned around and 
substantially reduced disclosure rules in the name of simplification, transparency, and 
reduced compliance burdens.  This change fits with the general trend towards 
deregulation under President Reagan in the 1980’s. 
 
The Current Regime 
  The current regime of disclosure rules began in 1992 with a complete overhaul of 
how executive pay is treated in proxy statements.  Disclosure was expanded from the 
three most highly paid executives to the CEO and the other 4 most highly paid 
                                                 
6 This section draws much from McGahran, 1988, who provides an extensive and clear explanation of the 
changes in the late 1970’s. executives.
7  Firms now had to report salary, bonus, perks, and long term compensation 
going back 3 years.  The SEC added a performance chart to the proxy that compared the 
firm’s stock return to a reasonable benchmark so that investors could see the relationship 
between pay and performance, and a compensation committee report was required to 
identify explicitly the performance measures used to determine pay and the general goals 
of the compensation package.  In addition, a number of new tables were added to the 
proxy statement meant to disclose many of the vehicles that firms had been using to 
disguise the total value of pay.  For example, firms had to disclose the value of retirement 
plans and severance packages over a certain threshold.
8 
  Firms also had to begin to report the value of stock options granted, unlike under 
the 1983 rule when just the number of shares was reported.  They had three choices: the 
Black-Scholes method, or calculating the potential value of the options assuming 5 or 10 
percent annual stock appreciation.  Murphy (1996) examines firms’ reporting choices and 
finds that they tended to use whatever valuation method gave the smallest value for the 
options. 
  Lo (2003) studies the effect of the 1992 rule on stock returns.  She considers firms 
that submitted comments to the SEC criticizing expanded disclosure, and assumes that 
those firms were the ones who likely had some sort of agency problem.  That is, if they 
were against disclosure, it was probably because they had something to hide.  She finds 
that these firms had excess returns of approximately 6 percent during the 3 month period 
over which the new rule was considered and saw improvements in returns on both assets 
and equity. 
In 1993, Canada expanded disclosure in a manner similar to the US.  Because 
there is so little direct evidence on the impact of disclosure in the US, studying other 
countries’ experiences is critical.  In Canada, firms were not only required to report 
current compensation, but also the previous three years.
9  Park et al. (2001) and 
Craighead et al. (2004) study this change.  Park et al. (2001) find that disclosure actually 
raises pay, which they argue is due to executives’ increased bargaining power when they 
have better information about the pay of their peers.  Craighead et al. (2004) argue, on the 
other hand, that Park et al. (2001) find increased pay because their sample of firms 
changes over time and because they do not properly control for the effects of accounting 
performance on pay.  Craighead et al. (2004) use a subtler identification strategy, arguing 
that disclosure should have different effects on closely held versus widely held firms.  In 
closely held firms, monitoring should be effective even in the absence of mandatory 
disclosure.  Thus, they find that following disclosure, pay becomes more closely tied to 
performance in widely held firms. 
                                                 
7 Disclosure was also extended somewhat to cover directors, though the disclosure is still not as extensive 
as it is for executives. 
8 The rule was slightly expanded in 1993.  Previously, if an executive retired, his or her compensation was 
not reported in that year, encouraging the use of massive payments on the date of retirement.  As of 1993, 
firms had to report the pay of any executive who left the firm but was among the 5 highest paid employees 
prior to leaving. 
9 This was also true in the US following 1992, but it was phased in so that no new information on, e.g., 
1991, was ever reported.  
The 2006 Rule  
  The final change to disclosure occurred in 2006.  After the SEC proposed new 
rules in January, it received 20,000 public comments, more than any other SEC proposal 
in history.  The 1992 change garnered only 900 comments (still more than the 1983 and 
1978 rules combined).  The 2006 rule has been viewed as a huge change in how pay is 
reported, even though it looks outwardly very similar to the prior regime, in the sense that 
the summary compensation table is retained, along with familiar tables detailing options 
grants, pensions, etc.  The major difference in the 2006 rule, as noted by Brown (2007), is 
that it is “principles-based” rather than “rule-based.”  That is, the SEC wants every 
component of compensation to be disclosed, regardless of whether there is a specific 
provision for it.  Firms are supposed to disclose thoroughly what their total liabilities are 
to the CEO, including severance packages, pensions, and deferred compensation.  
Extending principles-based disclosure to the proxy statement fits with recent general 
trends, including the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s new rules for stock option 
valuation (see below).  Furthermore, the 2006 rule makes clear that all potential payments 
to executives are to be disclosed, not just those that were paid out in the prior year. 
  To an economist, the 2006 rule looks like a triumph of common sense.  It is 
designed to tell investors the change in what the firm owes an executive over the past 
year.  For example, in the past, firms were required just to report payments from long 
term compensation packages.  Now they are required to report the change in what they 
actually owe to the executive.  The SEC also pushed much harder for plain English 
disclosure of what the firm is actually trying to accomplish with its pay package, rather 
than allowing firms to continue their use of complex accounting terminology.  This 
brings compensation disclosure in line with the financial statements, which require the 
same sort of plain English reporting. 
  To be more specific (though by no means exhaustive), the new rules expanded 
disclosure in the following ways:
 10  
•  All components of compensation must be measured in dollar terms 
•  Add a new table summarizing the pay of directors 
•  Deferred compensation is now included in the summary compensation 
table 
•  Disclosure of severance and retirement packages is substantially enhanced 
•  Add disclosure of specific targets and the range of potential payouts for 
incentive plans 
•  Perks must be disclosed if they are worth more than $10,000 (as opposed 
to $50,000 as of 1992) 
                                                 
10 Brown, 2007, has a useful table listing the changes from the 1992 to the 2006 rule. •  “All other compensation,” which includes components of pay not included 
in salary, bonus, or stock, must be disclosed in a separate table listing any 
individual component worth more than $10,000 
•  Eliminate flexibility in disclosure of the value of options (firms have to 
follow the current financial accounting standard – the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s rule 123R) 
•  When options are repriced, the incremental change in their value is 
reported in the proxy, instead of treating them as new grants (or not 
reporting them at all) as in the past 
  As noted above, these changes are all designed to allow investors to see the total 
amount of money that can potentially be paid to executives.  The changes to reporting for 
severance and retirement packages are possibly the most important.  Firms are now 
required to exhaustively list the possible payments if executives are terminated or there is 
a change in control.  They also have to explain precisely what executives stand to receive 
in annual benefits from retirement plans.  Previously, these two types of packages were 
what caused some of the largest outcries because they were often only revealed after 
executives were fired.  For example, Disney had to spend millions of dollars fighting off 
a lawsuit that arose almost entirely due to a severance package paid to an executive who 
worked for only a year. 
  Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) find that, prior to the 2006 rule change, substantial 
amounts of compensation were being effectively hidden in retirement plans.  The median 
CEO had a pension worth twice what they earned in salary during their entire tenure.  
This amount is seems considerable when one considers that while salary constitutes less 
than half of total compensation, it nevertheless comprises the majority of cash 
compensation.  Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) also find that if previous studies had 
included the value of pensions in total compensation, they would have found pay to be far 
less connected to performance.  Moreover, by paying CEOs through pensions, firms are 
able to avoid certain tax liabilities associated with salaries over $1 million.
11 
  There is as yet little research on the results of the 2006 changes.  Beucler and 
Domat-Connell (2007), however, provide a review of investor opinions on the changes 
that gives at least anecdotal evidence on how disclosure has changed in practice.  In some 
respects, they are optimistic.  They find that disclosure is genuinely more extensive, with 
the disclosure of retirement benefits and director pay being two of the more effective 
improvements.   
On the other hand, they find that firms still are not being as transparent as the 
SEC had predicted in the text of their 2006 rule.  The Compensation Discussion and 
Analysis (CD&A), is one major area of concern.  While the SEC encouraged plain 
English disclosure and had envisioned the CD&A only requiring 1,000 words, the median 
in 2007 was 4,726 words long, according to Beucler and Domat-Connell (2007).  
Moreover, they do not see it as in any way transparent to the average investor.  An 
important question, though, is whether the length and opacity of the CD&A is due to 
                                                 
11 See the discussion of IRC section 162(m) in section 3 below. firms trying to mislead investors or simply because firms are being careful due to the new 
liability associated with the CD&A which I discuss below. 
The other major shortfall that Beucler and Domat-Connell (2007) find in the 2007 
proxy statements involves the disclosure of the value of equity compensation.  As noted 
above, the SEC now requires principles-based disclosure of equity compensation, rather 
than requiring a single valuation method, but Beucler and Domat-Connell (2007) find 
that 54 percent of companies do not report their valuation methodology.
12 
 In the end, it is clear that the new rule is a major step in the right direction, and 
that disclosure now covers all changes in liabilities to the CEO (including both current 
compensation and expected future payments).  Nevertheless, as is common with new 
standards, some guidance from the SEC is probably necessary in order to help clarify 
expectations. 
 
3. Laws Affecting the Composition of Pay 
Around the same time that the SEC was decreasing mandatory disclosure, the 
Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.  This law included a new set of taxes 
on severance packages.  While severance packages were not enormously common at that 
time, congress acted to limit their use by limiting when they could be deducted from 
corporate income taxes and imposing a 20 percent excise tax on any severance package 
deemed “excessive.”
13  The technical definition of excessive here turned out to be three 
times average annual pay over the previous 5 years.  I have been unable to find any 
research on the effects of this law, but the literature seems to agree that if anything, this 
new law actually encouraged the use of severance package (see, e.g. Jensen, Murphy, and 
Wruck, 2005).  It was interpreted as a congressional endorsement of packages up to three 
times annual pay as “reasonable.”   
In 1993, again, just after a change in disclosure rules, Congress passed a major 
change to the tax code.  A new section, 162(m), was added to the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC).  It says that all compensation over $1 million that is not performance-based is 
deemed excessive and does not qualify to be deducted from corporate income.  For 
income to qualify as performance-based, it has to be associated with specific targets with 
a horizon of at least 12 months, be approved by a compensation committee composed of 
at least two independent directors, and be put up for a shareholder vote.
14 
                                                 
12 However, they do not say whether they looked for a description of the valuation methodology in the 10-
k.  Since valuation of equity awards is now supposed to be consistent across the proxy and financial 
statement, it seems possible that firms just list their valuation methodology once in the financial reports. 
13 Note that the 20 percent tax is not a marginal tax.  That is, it applies to the full value of the severance 
package only if it is above the limit.  So if an executive has a $1 million salary, then he pays no tax on a $3 
million severance package, but would pay $600,000 on a $3,000,001 package, netting him only $2.4 
million. 
14 “Independent” was defined as more than not being an employee of the firm, but also not receiving any 
pay from the company for, e.g., a consulting relationship. The history of changes in policies related to executive compensation disclosure 
suggests that the rules do not just come out of thin air.  In general, they are in response to 
encouragement from parts of the investment community.  The changes we observe in 
1992 had been endorsed explicitly by institutional investors.  For example, as of 1993, 
the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, a multi-billion dollar pension fund, 
pushed for companies in which they invested to have a majority of their boards made up 
of independent directors, nominating and compensation committees that were fully 
independent, and a separate chairman and CEO (see Dodell, 1993). 
Dodell (1993) also cites statements by the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CALPERS).  CALPERS supported legislation similar to what was 
actually enacted in 1992.  Specifically, it pushed for better disclosure and governance, but 
did not advocate that the government try to determine what constituted “reasonable” pay.  
It also argued that tax increases, like 162(m) would just come out of corporate profits.
15   
Firms that pay salaries less than $1 million have strong incentives to shift towards 
performance-based pay, which should be a positive development, and they pay no extra 
taxes.  On the other hand, the vast majority of firms now pay salaries above $1 million.  
The tax still makes incentive-based pay relatively cheap, but firms are also paying a large 
amount of new taxes, which come out of profits.  Even if firms are willing to pay salaries 
above $1 million, though, 162(m) should still have an effect since a dollar of 
compensation paid as salary is more expensive to a corporation than a dollar paid that is 
performance-based. 
  A number of authors have studied the effects of the 1992 tax and disclosure 
changes.  Vafeas and Afxentiou (1998) find that after 1992, compensation committees 
included noticeably fewer insiders, and compensation seems to be more closely tied to 
performance.  These two effects are to be expected both from the 162(m) and the SEC 
rule.  Perry and Zenner (2001) confirm that pay was increasingly sensitive to 
performance.  They also say that firms paying salaries slightly above $1 million prior to 
1992 tended to reduce them after, but that firms paying higher salaries were largely 
unaffected. 
  The legal and consulting community, to some extent, has argued that 162(m) is 
not nearly as stringent as it sounds.  First, companies and executives had a one-time 
opportunity to avoid tax charges by shifting income from 1993 (when the law first 
applied) into 1992.  Moreover, by awarding salary but then deferring payment until 
retirement, firms could completely avoid the $1 million cap (see, e.g., Kroll, 1998).
16  
The rules about pay being tied to performance are also easily skirted.  Suppose the 
compensation committee says that the CEO receives 1 percent of total sales above some 
level as her bonus.  If, at the end of the year, they try to increase the bonus for some other 
                                                 
15 In general, institutional investors very consistently say that they do not want to interfere with the 
determination of “reasonable” salaries.  Rather, they push for independent boards and strong incentives for 
CEOs. 
16 Nusbacher and Johnston, 1993, note that deferred compensation may not be very attractive to 
corporations.  The compensation shows up on current financial reports but does not provide a tax deduction 
until it is paid.  Moreover, they have to pay taxes on all of the investment earnings. subjective reason, then the entire bonus no longer counts as performance-based, and the 
firm pays taxes on it.  Suppose, on the other hand, the firm says that its official policy is 
to set the bonus to 2 percent of sales, but then it just revises the bonus downward at will 
to meet whatever value it deems appropriate.  This alternative package will then likely 
pass muster with IRS.  So even though 162(m) gave firms greater incentive to use 
performance-based pay, it also gave them incentive to make the targets relatively easy to 
achieve (see Salwen and Laarman, 1993).  That said, a firm’s pay package will look 
suspicious to both the IRS and investors if it involves a massive payout for performance 
that is then revised downwards every year, so there are limits to this strategy.
17   
  Regardless of the ways that firms can minimize the effects of 162(m), it certainly 
contributed to the enormous rise in the use of stock options.  Some firms have even made 
standing offers to executives that allow them to trade salary for (non-qualified) option 
grants.  The tax treatment of stock options was made even more attractive with the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.  These 
acts lowered the maximum capital gains tax rate from 28 to 20 percent, and this had an 
immediate impact on executive pay.  Under the new laws, if an executive receives an 
incentive-based stock option (also known as a qualified option), they never pay income 
taxes on it as long as they do not exercise it within two years of the grant date.  The entire 
value is treated as a capital gain.  This makes qualified options much more attractive to 
executives, and even more so after the further reduction in capital gains tax rates that 




4. Corporate Governance:  “Care and Loyalty” 
External Governance 
While changes in the 1990’s affected the composition of pay, changes in the late 
1980’s may have had a substantial effect on its level.  Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in CTS v. Dynamics Corp., states were allowed to write laws making hostile 
takeovers much more difficult.
18  Delaware, the state in which more than half of firms are 
incorporated, enacted its anti-takeover legislation in 1988.  This was a business 
combination law that worked mainly to inhibit leveraged buyouts.  Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (1999) provide an extensive discussion of the history of these laws.  They 
                                                 
17 Kroll, 1998, and Nusbacher and Johnston, 1993, discuss issues associated with 162(m) from the 
perspective of the legal and compensation consulting communities. 
18 Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999, provide a detailed description of the various laws and their history.  
Until fairly recently, most corporate law operated at the state level.  Corporations exist as creations of 
states, rather than the federal government.  Therefore, a very large part of the statutory and case law 
originates in the states. then exploit the cross-state variation in the laws to measure their effects on executive pay.  
They find that pay tended to rise in firms affected by the new laws. 
Interestingly, they also find a rise in pay for performance in these same firms.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis that because agency problems increased, firms had 
to increase the incentives for good performance.  Moreover, because compensation 
became riskier, its expected value had to rise in order for executives to get the same 
value.  What is worrisome, however, is that the increase in pay for performance only 
occurred in firms with a large shareholder.  Firms without a large shareholder must have 
then had an increase in agency problems without an attendant change in pay structure to 
mitigate them.
19  The changes in executive pay following changes in how easy it is to buy 
out firms is an example of the market for corporate control acting as a monitoring 
mechanism (see Jensen, 1993) 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 covered a diverse set of issues related to 
corporate governance.  A few of its provisions directly affect executive compensation.  
First, it disallows loans from corporations to their executives, a type of compensation 
heavily criticized by Bebchuk and Fried (2004).  Second, since the CEO and Chief 
Financial Officer must now personally certify financial statements, if those statements are 
materially revised, the CEO is required to give the company back 100 percent of his or 
her performance based compensation.  Third, it requires that the board be made up of a 
majority of independent directors, and that the nominating and compensation committees 
be entirely independent.  At the same time, the three major stock exchanges, the NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and AMEX, made their definitions of independence more stringent.  The 
independent directors on the board are also now required to meet in executive session 
without the insiders at least once a year.  These changes further enhance the rules 
applying to compensation committees in 162(m).  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) study the effects of the provisions of 
Sarbanes–Oxley related to board independence on CEO compensation.  They find that 
firms that were affected by this policy decreased compensation paid to their executives 
by 10 to 25 percent more than the change in pay by firms that were unaffected.  Their 
analysis is one of the few available differences-in-differences studies of executive pay.  
Interestingly, they find that the majority of the decline in pay came from options, rather 
than cash.  This implies that rather than options being used as a way to solve agency 
problems, if anything, they were used to inflate pay.   
One of the major concerns in the comments to the SEC about the 1992 and 2006 
rules was that it could open the board of directors to new kinds of lawsuits.  In particular, 
firms were worried that they could be sued over the content of the compensation 
committee report if it contained even a minor mistake.  In the 2006 revised regulations, 
the compensation committee report was somewhat downsized and replace with the 
“Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A).”  Since the CD&A is officially filed 
                                                 
19 Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, first showed the relationship between large shareholders and the quality of 
corporate governance. with the SEC, it could conceivably be used as part of a lawsuit.
20  Firms also worried that 
the increased disclosure might bring more frivolous lawsuits and that it might force them 
to reveal trade secrets.  The same sort of concerns arose around the time Sarbanes-Oxley 
was passed.  These concerns seem to have been unfounded, at least with relation to 
executive pay.  Over the years, it has proven essentially impossible to sue corporations 
over pay packages.  The new rules, in particular the compensation committee report, the 
required independence of the compensation committee, and the requirement in 162(m) 
that pay packages be approved by shareholders, make suits over executive pay even less 
likely to succeed than in the past.
21  Moreover, the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 made it more difficult for shareholders to sue firms, thus weakening even 
further the power of shareholders.
22  
  The fiduciary duties of boards of directors can be divided into a duty of care and a 
duty of loyalty.
23  When shareholders sue corporations over pay packages, they generally 
allege a violation of these fiduciary duties.  The duty of loyalty says that directors must 
act in the best interests of the shareholders, rather than themselves.  The duty of care says 
that directors must take due care in their decisions, gathering all relevant information and 
keeping abreast of all developments.  Under a principle called the business judgment rule, 
courts are generally unwilling to question the decisions that boards make; rather, they 
will only look at the process at which the board arrived at the decision.  As long as the 
process looks to have been duly deliberative and the board had no personal stake in the 
decision, courts will not question whether it was actually a good idea. 
The combined effect of the SEC’s 1992 and 2006 rules, IRC section 162(m), and 
Sarbanes-Oxley is to make all three types of claims more difficult than in the past.  
Because the compensation committee is now fully independent and the definition of 
independence is more strict, duty of loyalty claims are more difficult.  Outside directors 
are generally given the benefit of the doubt with relation to self-dealing, whereas the 
burden of proof can be on inside directors to prove that they are not violating the duty of 
loyalty.  The compensation committee report also makes duty of care claims more 
difficult than in the past.  When the committee explicitly explains its motivation for the 
pay package, it is essentially showing that it took care in determining pay.  Finally, 
because many pay packages are subject to shareholder approval, courts are unlikely to 
rule them wasteful.  The logic is, if a reasonable person would not approve of this pay 
package, the definition of waste, then why would the shareholders have voted for it?  
Whether this logic makes sense (many shareholders probably do not read proxies 
carefully, and many do not even vote at all), it is the current state of affairs in the courts. 
 
                                                 
20 This is as opposed to the compensation committee report, which is only “furnished,” which opens firms 
to less risk of liability. 
21 See, for example, the discussion in Olson, Mueller, and Rogers, 1993. 
22 Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson, 2000, however, find that for a sample of high-technology firms, the 
PSLRA increased the market value of firms most likely to be involved in securities litigation.  They note, 
however, that the benefit of limiting litigation is weaker when other governance mechanisms are also 
weaker. 
23 This section draws heavily on Pinto and Branson, 2004. 5.  Say on Pay 
  In recent years, there has been an increased movement within the ranks of 
corporate governance activists, institutional investors, and even legislatures, for 
corporations to accept “Say on Pay” rules.  In general, shareholders cannot directly 
submit resolutions for a vote at a firm’s annual meeting.    In 1992, the SEC expanded the 
list of allowed types of resolutions to include those regarding executive compensation, 
which would include say on pay. 
Standard say on pay rules require that companies submit executive compensation 
packages to the shareholders for a nonbinding advisory vote.  As of the writing of this 
article, a measure has passed the House of Representatives, but has not yet come up for a 
vote in the Senate.  It is supported by both US presidential candidates, and was in fact 
introduced by the Democratic nominee, Barack Obama (Ferri and Maber, 2007).   
  Even though say on pay is not yet mandatory, there has been a recent push among 
institutional investors to force companies to accept it.  In 2007, 51 such proposals came 
up for votes, getting an average of 43 percent of shareholders voting in favor.  As of May 
6 of this year, 30 more proposals were voted on, drawing nearly identical support (Tse, 
2008).  In general, companies have been strongly against these proposals.  Their main 
argument is that companies will no longer be able to attract the best talent because they 
will have to keep salaries low.  Supposing this is true, it simply means that we should 
mandate say on pay for all companies.  That way no individual firm will be at a 
disadvantage. 
  Our theoretical understanding of the effects of say on pay rules is very limited.  
The closest model is probably that of Singh (2007), who argues that firms may tailor their 
pay packages in order to signal that they are responsible.  Alternatively, they might be 
able to signal their quality using the adoption of a say on pay measure.  For example, 
suppose say on pay has the cost that it keeps a firm from hiring the very best CEOs, but it 
also keeps boards from overpaying their CEO.  In that case, all boards would find it 
somewhat costly to adopt say on pay, but the boards who were the most beholden to the 
CEO would find it most costly, and hence we might find a separating equilibrium. 
  In terms of empirical results, the say on pay measures are so new that we only 
have very limited evidence.  Johnson and Shackell (1997) study a related rule change 
from 1992.  In that year, the SEC expanded the list of topics about which shareholders 
make submit proposals that can come up for a vote at the annual meeting.  These sorts of 
proposals are often related to corporate governance, but the board can block any proposal 
that relates to the firm’s “ordinary business.”  In 1992, the SEC stated that the ordinary 
business exclusion no longer related to executive compensation.  Johnson and Shackell 
(1997) study proposals relating to executive compensation from 1992 to 1995.  They find 
no evidence that these proposals have any effect on the level of pay.  However, they do 
find that proposals relating to the independence of the compensation committee, in particular those submitted by institutional investors, often do lead to changes in the 
independence of that committee.
24 
  Deane (2007) examines the results of mandatory say on pay in other countries.  
Five countries, the UK, Netherlands, Australia, Sweden and Norway, have instituted 
mandatory say on pay.  In the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, the say on pay votes are 
binding, unlike in the UK, Australia, and the proposed rule for the US where the votes are 
simply advisory.  Thus far, very few compensation proposals have been rejected.  The 
rejection in the UK of GlaxoSmithKline’s package in 2003 has been widely noted since it 
led to the replacement of the entire compensation committee, but only four more 
packages have been rejected since then.  In the Netherlands, Australia and Sweden, no 
packages have been rejected yet, though a few have received dissent nearing the 50 
percent mark. 
  However, the simple fact that packages are not being rejected obviously doesn’t 
mean that the new rules have had no effect.  On the contrary, surveys across the five 
countries find that investors seem generally happy with the results of the new rules.  In 
particular, Deane (2007) cites a number of studies finding that investors see pay as being 
more connected to performance.  More importantly, there seems to be much better 
communication between boards and investors.   
A survey by Deloitte and Touche (2004) finds that 60 percent of investors think 
that the extent to which companies confer with investors has increased “to a large 
extent,” and 100 percent of those surveyed believed that communication had improved at 
least somewhat.  However, UK investors still desire better disclosures.  The quantity of 
information disclosed in the UK, as in the US, is substantial.  At least according to 
investors, there are substantial costs to digesting all of the disclosures.  Moreover, the 
policy that UK investors find most important in affecting compensation plans is the 
shareholder vote, rather than disclosure, even though the votes are nearly uniformly 
positive. 
  The only study that has so far applied state of the art empirical techniques to find 
the effect of say on pay on compensation is Ferri and Maber (2007) who look at 
executive pay in the UK from 2000 to 2007.  Across a variety of specifications, they find 
that pay has become more sensitive to performance, especially negative performance.  
However, they find no evidence at all that say on pay has reduced the level of pay – if 
anything, pay may have risen somewhat (though if executives’ pay becomes more risky, 
then its value to them falls).   
  The general results of mandatory say on pay in other countries can thus be 
summarized as follows.  Compensation packages are rejected extremely rarely, largely 
owing to improved communication between investors and board members.  Furthermore, 
pay becomes more connected to performance, but its level does not fall at all.  Thus, as 
Deane (2007) notes, some of the major concerns about say on pay in the US may be 
                                                 
24 Johnson and Shackell, 1997, also cite Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996, who find that in the 
1980’s, shareholder proposals related to corporate governance led to no improvement in corporate 
governance or performance. unfounded.  Large shareholders do not tend to vote on compensation packages based on 
their size, but rather on their composition.  So it is unlikely that firms would no longer be 
able to attract talent and pay them at market rates.  Moreover, the voting process has not 
been radicalized.  That is, votes on compensation packages have not thus far been used as 
levers by special interest groups. 
 
6. Conclusion  
  This paper summarizes the development of the rules and regulations that have 
direct and indirect effects on executive compensation.  With only a limited exception, 
namely backtracking in 1983, the path has been towards greater disclosure of both pay 
and possible conflicts of interest.  Pay disclosure has also become clearer and much more 
thorough over time.  It is actually difficult to find any major flaws in the current rules 
governing how executive pay is disclosed.  The point that we have now arrived at in 
disclosure is a combination of rule-based and principle-based disclosure.  There is a large 
set of tables that firms have to fill in, but the general rule is that they need to disclose any 
potential payments to executives.  As long as this is carried out in good faith, there is no 
reason to think that investors would be uninformed. 
The remaining question then revolves around corporate governance, which covers 
an enormous range of issues.  This paper summarizes the subset of those issues most 
closely related to executive pay.  The general finding is that when governance improves, 
stock prices go up and executive pay seems both to fall and to become more sensitive to 
performance.  The major limit in governance at this point seems to be that directors are 
still too insulated from shareholders.  Even if a director is completely independent, he/she 
may be more interested in keeping a seat on the board than doing what is in the best 
interests of the shareholders.  That is, directors may still care more about the happiness of 
the nominating committee than that of the shareholders. 
Say on pay is one way to rectify problems with governance.  The rules in 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandating fully independent nominating and compensation committees 
are also a step in the right direction.  By keeping the nominating fully independent, 
directors need not worry about angering the CEO and then losing their seat.  A further 
step would be to strengthen the definition of independence. 
All of that having been said, the first thing we need is more research on what 
effects government policies actually have.  There are numerous proposals for how to 
improve corporate governance and reform executive compensation, but without knowing 
what effects past policies have, we cannot hope to make good plans for the future.References 
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